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MANDATORY ARBITRATION AND 
SEXUAL HARASSMENT CLAIMS:  #METOO- 
AND TIME’S UP-INSPIRED ACTION AGAINST 
THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT 
Kathleen McCullough* 
 
The rise of the #MeToo movement and Time’s Up campaign has brought 
the issue of sexual harassment into the national spotlight.  Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission filings for sexual harassment claims have 
increased 13 percent since the start of the #MeToo movement, and a little 
over a year since its creation on January 1, 2018, the Time’s Up Legal 
Defense Fund has received 4139 requests for representation in sexual 
harassment claims.  However, the U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted the 
Federal Arbitration Act to enforce mandatory arbitration clauses for 
employment claims, including sexual harassment claims—an interpretation 
that prohibits employees from pursuing litigation in court.  Recently, federal 
and state legislation that prohibit mandatory arbitration of sexual 
harassment claims have been proposed and enacted.  However, the Federal 
Arbitration Act generally preempts state actions, and current federal actions 
are limited in scope. 
This Note examines the Federal Arbitration Act’s enactment and evolution 
to its current “super-statute” status that preempts state actions to limit or 
prohibit mandatory arbitration.  This Note then explores recent federal, 
state, and corporate responses to combat mandatory arbitration of sexual 
harassment claims.  Finally, this Note argues that federal action is necessary 
because state action attacking mandatory arbitration, whether directly or 
covertly, is likely preempted by federal law.  This Note also encourages 
alternative options to limit the impact of mandatory arbitration, such as 
empowering attorneys general to pursue sexual harassment claims, 
encouraging companies to waive mandatory arbitration, and prohibiting 
nondisclosure agreements. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In July 2016, Gretchen Carlson, a former Fox News anchor, sued Fox 
News CEO Roger Ailes for sexual harassment.1  Carlson filed her claim in 
state court despite a mandatory arbitration clause in her employment 
contract.2  Carlson’s suit prompted several other women to come forward, 
which placed pressure on Fox News and led to Roger Ailes’s eventual 
resignation.3  However, as part of the $20 million settlement, Carlson cannot 
discuss the approach her lawyers utilized to file her claim and negotiate the 
settlement.4 
The U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted the Federal Arbitration Act 
(FAA)5 to require the enforcement of mandatory arbitration clauses for 
employment claims, including sexual harassment claims.6  Mandatory 
 
 1. Hope Reese, Gretchen Carlson on How Forced Arbitration Allows Companies 
to Protect Harassers, VOX (May 21, 2018, 11:44 AM), https://www.vox.com/conversations/ 
2018/4/30/17292482/gretchen-carlson-me-too-sexual-harassment-supreme-court 
[https://perma.cc/FHC2-B8UL]. 
 2. Id.; see also Michael M. Grynbaum & John Koblin, Gretchen Carlson of Fox News 
Files Harassment Suit Against Roger Ailes, N.Y. TIMES (July 6, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/07/business/media/gretchen-carlson-fox-news-roger-
ailes-sexual-harassment-lawsuit.html [https://perma.cc/HGH7-2FLF]. 
 3. Reese, supra note 1. 
 4. Id. 
 5. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2012). 
 6. See infra Part I.C. 
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arbitration clauses, and the nondisclosure agreements that often accompany 
them, allow serial sexual predators to operate for decades before being held 
accountable.7  As Carlson herself stated, “Forced arbitration is a sexual 
harasser’s best friend:  It keeps proceedings secret, findings sealed, and 
victims silent.”8 
This Note examines the impact of mandatory arbitration on sexual 
harassment claims and assesses recent federal and state legislative action to 
limit or abolish the FAA.  Part I explores the FAA’s enactment and the 
Supreme Court’s subsequent arbitration jurisprudence and includes a brief 
discussion of the benefits and drawbacks of mandatory arbitration.  Part I 
also explains the rise of sexual harassment claims due to the #MeToo 
movement and Time’s Up campaign.  Part II then outlines current federal and 
state legislative attempts to prohibit or limit mandatory arbitration for sexual 
harassment claims and discusses whether the FAA is likely to preempt each 
action.  Part II also examines recent corporate initiatives to prohibit 
mandatory arbitration of sexual harassment claims. 
Part III advocates for the adoption of federal legislation to prohibit 
mandatory arbitration for sexual harassment claims.  In the absence of federal 
action, Part III argues that state legislative efforts should be employed to 
pressure both Congress and companies to act.  Finally, Part III proposes 
alternative solutions for limiting the impact of mandatory arbitration, 
including empowering state attorneys general to pursue sexual harassment 
claims, encouraging companies to waive mandatory arbitration clauses, and 
prohibiting nondisclosure agreements for sexual harassment claims 
altogether. 
I.  THE ENACTMENT AND EVOLUTION OF THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT 
To understand the impact of mandatory arbitration on sexual harassment 
claims, it is necessary to understand arbitration and the FAA’s rise and 
development into a “super-statute.”9  Part I.A defines mandatory arbitration, 
explains the scope of such agreements, and explores their benefits and 
drawbacks.  Part I.B outlines the FAA’s legislative history, which lends 
context to the statute’s scope.  Part I.C explores the Supreme Court’s 
interpretation and expansion of the FAA over the last twenty-eight years.  
 
 7. Hiba Hafiz, How Legal Agreements Can Silence Victims of Workplace Sexual Assault, 
ATLANTIC (Oct. 18, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2017/10/legal-
agreements-sexual-assault-ndas/543252/ [https://perma.cc/3AU3-5AC2]. 
 8. Gretchen Carlson, Gretchen Carlson:  The Supreme Court Tried to End #MeToo.  
Here’s How We’re Fighting Back., FORTUNE (May 31, 2018), http://fortune.com/2018/05/31/ 
gretchen-carlson-supreme-court-ruling-arbitration-metoo/ [https://perma.cc/XT8A-3VA9]. 
 9. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE L.J. 1215, 1216 
(2001) (“A super-statute is a law or series of laws that (1) seeks to establish a new normative 
or institutional framework for state policy and (2) over time does ‘stick’ in the public culture 
such that (3) the super-statute and its institutional or normative principles have a broad effect 
on the law—including an effect beyond the four corners of the statute. . . .  The law must also 
prove robust as a solution, a standard, or a norm over time . . . .”). 
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Finally, Part I.D examines the increase in sexual harassment claims due to 
the #MeToo movement and Time’s Up campaign. 
A.  Mandatory Arbitration:  Definition and Scope 
In arbitration, an impartial individual—the arbitrator—resolves a conflict 
based on the disputing parties’ evidence and arguments.10  The arbitrator 
makes a final and often binding decision based on the merits.11  Two main 
mechanisms subject employees to mandatory arbitration:  (1) agreements 
made upon hiring, and (2) company-wide employment policies.12  
Arbitration agreements may broadly apply to all employment claims or may 
narrowly require arbitration for only specific types of claims.13  When a 
dispute is resolved through arbitration, it excludes other forms of 
adjudication, such as litigation in court.14 
Mandatory arbitration clauses have dramatically increased over the past 
twenty-eight years.15  In 1992, only 2 percent of employees in the United 
States were subject to mandatory arbitration.16  This figure rose to almost 25 
percent by the early 2000s and exceeded 55 percent of employees in 2017.17  
An estimated sixty million American employees are now subject to 
mandatory arbitration clauses.18 
1.  The Benefits of Mandatory Arbitration 
Mandatory arbitration agreements may benefit both the employer and 
employee.19  Without mandatory arbitration, an employer may wait out 
smaller claims under the assumption that employees will be unable to pursue 
 
 10. Arbitration, A.B.A. (Oct. 11, 2018), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/ 
dispute_resolution/resources/DisputeResolutionProcesses/arbitration/ [https://perma.cc/R3K 
U-2DLU]; see also RICHARD A. BALES, COMPULSORY ARBITRATION:  THE GRAND EXPERIMENT 
IN EMPLOYMENT 3 (1997). 
 11. Arbitration can be binding or nonbinding. Arbitration, supra note 10.  A judge can 
enforce a binding arbitration decision, which can only be appealed in very rare circumstances. 
Id.  See generally United Paperworkers Int’l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29 (1987) (holding 
arbitration to be final and binding); W. R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, Int’l Union of the 
United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum & Plastic Workers, 461 U.S. 757 (1983) (holding that federal 
courts may not overrule arbitration decisions even when a court believes that its own 
interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement is more accurate). 
 12. ALEXANDER J. S. COLVIN, ECON. POLICY INST., THE GROWING USE OF MANDATORY 
ARBITRATION:  ACCESS TO THE COURTS IS NOW BARRED FOR MORE THAN 60 MILLION 
AMERICAN WORKERS 5 (2017), https://www.epi.org/files/pdf/135056.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
E5K8-KKCW]. 
 13. BALES, supra note 10, at 3; see also Clauses, AM. ARB. ASS’N, https://www.adr.org/ 
clauses [https://perma.cc/Z9H8-54N7] (last visited Apr. 10, 2019). 
 14. See BALES, supra note 10, at 4; see also supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
 15. See COLVIN, supra note 12, at 1. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. at 2. 
 19. Theodore J. St. Antoine, Mandatory Arbitration:  Why It’s Better Than It Looks, 41 
U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 783, 790 (2008) (arguing that, in practice, mandatory arbitration 
agreements are the most sensible arrangement for both employers and employees). 
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such claims in court.20  At the same time, employees are unlikely to 
voluntarily arbitrate cases with potentially high jury awards.21  Proponents 
of mandatory arbitration argue that “no viable alternative”22 for resolving 
workplace disputes exists, especially for low-wage employees who may not 
be able to access the court system.23 
Arbitration is considered a more accessible forum24 where employees can 
successfully represent themselves25 and attorneys can expend less time and 
effort.26  Mandatory arbitration can also provide a forum with subject-matter 
expertise and can provide confidentiality to employees who do not want to 
go through depositions or testify in open court.27 
2.  The Drawbacks of Mandatory Arbitration 
Mandatory arbitration agreements can have major drawbacks for 
employees.28  Critics of mandatory arbitration suggest that employees are 
 
 20. See id.; see also Samuel Estreicher, Saturns for Rickshaws:  The Stakes in the Debate 
over Predispute Employment Arbitration Agreements, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 559, 
563–64 (2001). 
 21. See St. Antoine, supra note 19, at 790; see also Estreicher, supra note 20, at 563–64. 
 22. St. Antoine, supra note 19, at 810. 
 23. See id. at 812; see also Lewis L. Maltby, Employment Arbitration and Workplace 
Justice, 38 U.S.F. L. REV. 105, 118 (2003) (“Employment arbitration needs to be preserved 
and improved, not abandoned.”).  Proponents of mandatory arbitration argue that “Due 
Process Protocols” establish basic fairness standards in mandatory arbitration and that 
arbitration is “surprisingly favorable” to employees as compared to court litigation. See 
Theodore J. St. Antoine, Labor and Employment Arbitration Today:  Mid-Life Crisis or New 
Golden Age?, 32 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1, 16–17 (2017); see also Lisa B. Bingham, 
Emerging Due Process Concerns in Employment Arbitration:  A Look at Actual Cases, 47 
LAB. L.J. 108 (1996).  But see KATHERINE V. W. STONE & ALEXANDER J. S. COLVIN, ECON. 
POLICY INST., EPI BRIEFING PAPER NO. 414, THE ARBITRATION EPIDEMIC:  MANDATORY 
ARBITRATION DEPRIVES WORKERS AND CONSUMERS OF THEIR RIGHTS 17–18 (2015), 
https://www.epi.org/files/2015/arbitration-epidemic.pdf [https://perma.cc/XD8D-GPE6] 
(“[A]rbitration procedures vary considerably in their degrees of formality, similarity to court 
procedures, and amount of due process provided to the participants.”). 
 24. See St. Antoine, supra note 23, at 15. 
 25. See id. 
 26. See St. Antoine, supra note 19, at 792.  In arbitration, parties are not required to follow 
strict court procedures that may require an attorney, such as the formal rules of evidence. See 
STONE & COLVIN, supra note 23, at 17.  Even with an attorney, arbitration may be more cost-
effective because discovery and motions are more limited. Id.  Additionally, arbitration may 
provide finality sooner than litigation because appeal rights are very limited. Id.; see also 
supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
 27. Helene Wasserman, Unintended Consequences:  How Legislative Responses to 
#MeToo May Harm Harassment Victims, 32 WESTLAW J. EMP., Feb. 27, 2018, at 1, 1–4.   
 28. See COLVIN, supra note 12, at 7 (arguing that mandatory arbitration is a growing threat 
to workers’ rights).  Parties to a mandatory employment arbitration agreement usually do not 
have equal bargaining power, which may create a “take-it-or-leave-it” situation. See 
Alexander J. S. Colvin, Organizational Primacy:  Employment Conflict in a Post-Standard 
Contract World, in RETHINKING WORKPLACE REGULATION:  BEYOND THE STANDARD 
CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT 194, 200 (Katherine V. W. Stone & Harry Arthurs eds., 2013).  
Critics of mandatory arbitration argue that the more the public learns about mandatory 
arbitration clauses, the more the public believes them to be “unjust and illegitimate.” See 
Victor D. Quintanilla & Alexander B. Avtgis, The Public Believes Predispute Binding 
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less likely to prevail in arbitration and, even if they do prevail, often recover 
less than they would through litigation.29  Mandatory arbitration may 
suppress meritorious claims and limit publicly accessible information due to 
nondisclosure agreements, which are often part of arbitration settlements.30 
Employers may have a significant advantage in the arbitration process 
because they often choose the applicable procedures and select the 
arbitrators.31  Employers also have a “repeat player” advantage because they 
are familiar with the system and may deal with the same arbitrator multiple 
times, which also creates the potential for unconscious bias in their favor.32  
Arbitration’s finality and limited right of appeal also increases reliance on 
the arbitrator’s neutrality, expertise, and fairness.33 
B.  Enactment of the Federal Arbitration Act 
The debate regarding the benefits and drawbacks of arbitration predates 
the enactment of the FAA.  American courts originally considered arbitration 
agreements illegal and void because they divested the courts of legislatively 
provided jurisdiction.34  In the early 1900s, judicial views began to change, 
but laws invalidating arbitration agreements remained.35  Dissatisfaction 
with this jurisprudence, especially in the commercial context, fostered a 
strong movement to change the law.36  In 1921, the American Bar 
Association (ABA) Committee on Commerce, Trade and Commercial Law 
drafted a bill to reverse the common-law rule invalidating the enforcement 
of arbitration agreements.37  This bill was introduced in the House and Senate 
in 1922 but never became law.38  In 1923, a new bill was introduced,39 and 
 
Arbitration Clauses Are Unjust:  Ethical Implications for Dispute-System Design in the Time 
of Vanishing Trials, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 2119, 2133 (2017). 
 29. See COLVIN, supra note 12, at 3.  In successful employment cases, federal court 
recovery averages approximately $143,497 versus $23,548 in arbitration, and state court 
recovery averages approximately $328,008 versus $23,548 in arbitration. See STONE & 
COLVIN, supra note 23, at 21. 
 30. See COLVIN, supra note 12, at 5–6; Michelle Dean, Contracts of Silence, COLUM. 
JOURNALISM REV. (Winter 2018), https://www.cjr.org/special_report/nda-agreement.php 
[https://perma.cc/UR23-LUDV].  See generally Alexander J. S. Colvin, Mandatory 
Arbitration and Inequality of Justice in Employment, 35 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 71 
(2014). 
 31. COLVIN, supra note 12, at 3. 
 32. See STONE & COLVIN, supra note 23, at 22–23.  Repeat players may also have an 
advantage due to their ability to lobby for beneficial changes. See id. 
 33. See id. at 5; see also supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
 34. See, e.g., Doyle v. Cont’l Ins. Co. 94 U.S. 535, 538 (1876); Ins. Co. v. Morse, 87 U.S. 
(20 Wall.) 445, 453 (1874); see also BALES, supra note 10, at 16. 
 35. BALES, supra note 10, at 16. 
 36. Stephen Friedman, Arbitration Provisions:  Little Darlings and Little Monsters, 79 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2035, 2038 (2011). 
 37. BALES, supra note 10, at 33. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 37. 
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Congress enacted the United States Arbitration Act40 (USAA), later 
recodified in 1947 as the Federal Arbitration Act.41 
The FAA governs the enforcement of arbitration agreements in contracts 
involving interstate commerce and maritime transactions.42  Judicial 
interpretation of the FAA generally focuses on the enforcement of arbitration 
clauses based on § 2 of the statute, which requires parties to any maritime 
transaction or transaction involving commerce to settle controversies arising 
out of a contract or transaction by arbitration.43  Under § 2, agreements to 
submit to arbitration are “valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such 
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”44  
Judicial interpretation of the FAA also focuses on § 1’s exception, which 
excludes “contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any 
other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.”45 
The original 1922 draft of the bill did not include the § 1 exception, and 
the scope of this exception is the subject of much debate.46  Before the 
exception’s introduction, Andrew Furuseth, the leader of the American 
Federation of Labor, objected to the bill.47  Furuseth believed that the bill 
would force employees to sign arbitration agreements and that arbitrators 
would be biased towards employers.48  Furuseth’s objection was noted in a 
January 1923 hearing before a subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary 
Committee.49  The report from this hearing reproduced a letter from 
Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover to Senator Thomas Sterling, the 
Chair of the subcommittee considering the bill.50  Hoover actively supported 
the bill and wrote that it should be amended if there were objections to the 
inclusion of “workers’ contracts.”51  The amended language Hoover 
suggested became the § 1 exception.52  Courts interpreting the FAA often 
reference Furuseth’s intent, the Judiciary Committee hearings, and Hoover’s 
letter to determine whether a party falls within the exception.53 
 
 40. Pub L. No. 68-401, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified as amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 
(2012)). 
 41. Pub. L. No. 80-282, 61 Stat. 669 (1947) (codified as amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 
(2012)). 
 42. Id.; BALES, supra note 10, at 17. 
 43. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012). 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. § 1. 
 46. BALES, supra note 10, at 33–34. 
 47. Id. at 34.  Andrew Furuseth was also the president of the International Seamen’s Union 
of America. Id.  Courts often consider Congress’s intent to be the same as Furuseth’s when 
interpreting the § 1 exception. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Sales and Contracts to Sell in Interstate and Foreign Commerce, and Federal 
Commercial Arbitration:  Hearing on S. 4213 and S. 4214 Before a Subcomm. of the S. Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 67th Cong. 9 (1923) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement of W. H. H. Piatt, 
Chairman, ABA Committee on Commerce, Trade and Commercial Law). 
 50. Id. at 14. 
 51. Letter from Herbert Hoover, Sec’y of Commerce, to Thomas Sterling, U.S. Senate 
(Jan. 31, 1923), reprinted in Hearing, supra note 49, at 14. 
 52. BALES, supra note 10, at 36. 
 53. See id. at 34, 37. 
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C.  Creating a Super-Statute:  The Federal Arbitration Act in the 
Employment Setting 
In the 1990s, seventy years after its enactment, the Supreme Court began 
to construe the FAA broadly.54  The Supreme Court cases that expanded the 
scope of the FAA are generally five-to-four decisions with strong majority 
opinions in favor of enforcing arbitration and equally intense dissents.55 
1.  Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.:  The Transformation 
into a Super-Statute Begins 
Beginning in 1991, the Supreme Court decided a series of cases that 
effectively transformed the FAA into a super-statute.56  In a seven-to-two 
decision in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,57 the Court expanded 
the FAA’s reach and held that an Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 
1967 (ADEA)58 claim could be subject to arbitration.59 
In Gilmer, an employee brought a suit in federal court alleging a violation 
of the ADEA, and the employer moved to compel arbitration, relying on the 
FAA.60  The employee argued that arbitration did not align with the purpose 
of the ADEA61 and emphasized the inadequacy of arbitration.62  However, 
the Supreme Court held that the claim was subject to mandatory arbitration,63 
reasoning that the FAA was adopted to “reverse the longstanding judicial 
hostility to arbitration agreements . . . and to place arbitration agreements 
upon the same footing as other contracts.”64  The Court dismissed the 
employee’s concerns regarding the adequacy of arbitration and stated that 
when parties agree to arbitrate a statutory claim they do not “forgo . . . 
substantive rights” but merely change the forum.65  The Court held that, 
without evidence suggesting that Congress had not intended the FAA to 
apply to ADEA claims, mandatory arbitration agreements were 
 
 54. Id. at 1. 
 55. See infra Part I.C. 
 56. Previous Supreme Court decisions began this process in the business and commercial 
contexts.  From the 1980s onward, the Court held that statutory claims may be subject to 
arbitration under the FAA, including claims arising from the Sherman Act, the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, civil provisions of the Racketeer Influence and Corrupt Organizations 
Act (RICO), and the Securities Act of 1993. See generally, e.g., Rodriguez de Quijas v. 
Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989); Shearson/Am. Express Inc. v. McMahon, 
482 U.S. 220 (1987); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 
(1985). 
 57. 500 U.S. 20 (1991). 
 58. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634 (2012). 
 59. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 35. 
 60. Id. at 23–24. 
 61. Id. at 27. 
 62. Id. at 31.  The employee in Gilmer also claimed that additional inadequacies of 
arbitration included lack of written opinions, limited appellate review, biased panels, lack of 
discovery, lack of “broad equitable relief,” and lack of class actions. Id. at 30–33. 
 63. See id. at 35. 
 64. Id. at 24. 
 65. Id. at 26. 
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enforceable.66  The Court also emphasized that judicial review of arbitration 
clauses must be analyzed with a “healthy regard” for the federal policy 
favoring arbitration.67 
In his dissent, Justice John Paul Stevens argued that the FAA did not apply 
to employment disputes.68  Drawing on legislative history, Stevens argued 
that the FAA applied only to commercial disputes, as evidenced by the 1923 
Senate hearing.69  In the hearing, the chairman of the ABA committee 
responsible for drafting the bill assured senators that the bill was not intended 
to “refer[] to labor disputes, at all.”70  The bill was intended to give 
commercial businesses the right to arbitrate.71  Stevens asserted that in 
applying the FAA to an ADEA claim, the Court “ha[d] effectively rewritten 
the statute.”72 
The Gilmer Court avoided the issue of whether the § 1 exception language 
applied because the issue was not argued in the lower courts and Gilmer’s 
arbitration agreement was not part of his employment contract.73 
2.  Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams:  Deciding the Exception’s Scope 
Ten years after Gilmer, in Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams,74 the Court 
squarely addressed the § 1 exception.75  In a five-to-four decision, the Court 
limited the employment contract exception to only transportation workers.76 
The Court explained that for an exception of the FAA to apply it must be 
premised on the language of § 1.77  Based on a textual interpretation, 
including application of the ejusdem generis78 canon, the Court held that the 
 
 66. Id.  This argument ignores the “last-in-time” canon, which states that more current 
statutes are granted greater weight than former statutes. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR., 
INTERPRETING LAW:  A PRIMER ON HOW TO READ STATUTES AND THE CONSTITUTION 136 
(2016). 
 67. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26 (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. 
Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)). 
 68. Id. at 36 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 69. See id. at 39; see also supra notes 46–52 and accompanying text. 
 70. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 39 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Hearing, supra note 49, at 9 
(statement of W. H. H. Piatt, Chairman, ABA Committee on Commerce, Trade and 
Commercial Law)). 
 71. Id. (describing the right to arbitrate as “the right or the privilege of sitting down and 
agreeing with each other as to what their damages are, if they want to do it”). 
 72. Id. at 43. 
 73. See id. at 25 n.2 (majority opinion); see also BALES, supra note 10, at 33. 
 74. 532 U.S. 105 (2001). 
 75. Id. at 109. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 113–15.  The employee also argued that the word “transaction” in § 2 applied 
only to commercial contracts, as opposed to employment contracts. Id. at 113.  The Court 
rejected this argument, reasoning that the employee’s interpretation would render the separate 
exception in § 1 superfluous. Id. 
 78. Ejusdem generis is a canon of statutory interpretation that is used to “interpret a 
general term to reflect the class of objects reflected in more specific terms accompanying it.” 
See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY, ELIZABETH GARRETT & JAMES J. BRUDNEY, 
CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION AND REGULATION 1195 (5th ed. 2014); see also, e.g., 
Ali v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 552 U.S. 214, 223–25 (2008) (applying the ejusdem generis 
canon). 
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§ 1 exclusion provision should be read narrowly.79  The Court focused on the 
plain meaning of the words in the exception and reasoned that it was 
unnecessary to heavily weigh the legislative history.80 
The Court acknowledged various amici, including twenty-one state 
attorneys general, who objected to a narrow reading of the exception because 
it preempted state claims and infringed on states’ rights.81  The Court rejected 
this argument and declined to overrule its previous decision, Southland Corp. 
v. Keating,82 which held that the FAA preempted state anti-arbitration laws.83  
Additionally, the Court gave weight to Congress’s failure to overturn 
Southland Corp.84 
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens reiterated many points from his 
Gilmer dissent85 and argued that the FAA only applied to commercial 
arbitration agreements.86  Stevens pointed to legislative history, including 
Representative George S. Graham’s floor debate remarks in 1924, to signify 
that the bill was understood to apply to “commercial contracts and admiralty 
contracts.”87  Stevens understood the § 1 exception to be read broadly—not 
creating superfluous text, but instead providing clarification necessary to 
eliminate opposition to the bill.88 
3.  AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion:  Preempting State Law “Obstacles” 
to the Federal Arbitration Act 
The Court continued to interpret the FAA broadly in AT&T Mobility LLC 
v. Concepcion.89  In Concepcion, the Court focused on the final phrase of 
§ 2, the “saving clause,” which states that arbitration agreements are 
invalidated by “generally applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, 
or unconscionability.”90  In a five-to-four decision, the Court held that the 
saving clause “preserves generally applicable contract defenses” but does not 
 
 79. Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 113–18. 
 80. Id. 
 81. See id. at 121–22. 
 82. 465 U.S. 1 (1984). 
 83. Id. at 15–16; see also Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 122–24. 
 84. Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 122.  The Supreme Court may consider legislative inaction 
when interpreting statutes. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 78, at 1202.  Under 
“[a]cquiescence rules,” when Congress takes no action to overturn or amend a statute in 
response to consistent Supreme Court interpretations that it is aware of, those interpretations 
are presumed to be correct. See id.; see also, e.g., Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 283–84 (1972) 
(analyzing legislative inaction as acquiescence). 
 85. See supra notes 68–72 and accompanying text. 
 86. Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 126 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 87. Id. at 125 (quoting 65 CONG. REC. 1931 (1924)).  Stevens also quoted Representative 
Ogden L. Mills, who introduced the 1922 bill in the House and stated that the FAA “provides 
that where there are commercial contracts and there is disagreement under the contract, the 
court can [en]force an arbitration agreement.” Id. at 125 n.2 (alteration in original) (quoting 
65 CONG. REC. 11,080 (1924)). 
 88. Id. at 128.  For more information regarding opposition to the bill and the introduction 
of an exception by Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover, see supra notes 46–52 and 
accompanying text. 
 89. 563 U.S. 333 (2011). 
 90. Id. at 339 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2). 
2664 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 87 
“preserve state-law rules” that frustrate the intent of the FAA.91  The 
overarching purpose of the FAA, as articulated by the Court, was “to ensure 
the enforcement of arbitration agreements according to their terms so as to 
facilitate streamlined proceedings.”92 
The Court reasoned that the California state rule requiring the availability 
of class-wide arbitration interfered with arbitration’s “streamlined 
proceedings.”93  The FAA preempted the California rule because it was an 
“obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and 
objectives” of the FAA.94 
Justice Breyer, dissenting, emphasized that the FAA’s saving clause 
permits courts to refuse enforcement of arbitration agreements for the same 
reasons a court would invalidate “any contract.”95  Breyer argued that the 
California rule would “reinforce, not obstruct,” the purpose of the FAA and 
could not be characterized as targeting arbitration because it imposed 
equivalent limitations on litigation.96  Breyer also raised a federalism97 
argument, specifically that contract defenses are normally decided by the 
states and that the saving clause reflected Congress’s intent to retain an 
important role for the states.98 
4.  Kindred Nursing Centers Ltd. Partnership v. Clark:  Preempting Covert 
Hostility to the Federal Arbitration Act 
In Kindred Nursing Centers Ltd. Partnership v. Clark,99 the Court 
emphasized that the FAA preempts state rules that discriminate against 
arbitration.100  In a seven-to-one decision,101 the Court followed Concepcion 
and held that the Kentucky Supreme Court had improperly singled out 
 
 91. See id. at 343.  The Court held that the FAA preempts states from conditioning the 
enforcement of an arbitration agreement on the availability of class-wide arbitration 
procedures. See id. at 340.  The Court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the California rule 
holding arbitration agreements unconscionable met the requirements of the saving clause. See 
id. at 341.  While Concepcion focused on class-wide arbitration of consumer contracts, the 
holding also applies to employment contracts. Id. 
 92. Id. at 344. 
 93. Id. at 346–48. 
 94. Id. at 352.  Justice Thomas’s concurrence argues that “[c]ontract defenses unrelated 
to the making of the agreement—such as public policy—could not be the basis for declining 
to enforce an arbitration clause.” Id. at 355 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 95. Id. at 359 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2). 
 96. Id. at 362–64. 
 97. “Federalism” here refers to the vertical division of authority between the federal and 
state governments. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:  PRINCIPLES & POLICIES 3 
(4th ed. 2011).  Issues regarding the allocation of power between the federal and state 
governments often arise when determining whether to narrowly construe congressional 
authority or find federal laws unconstitutional for infringing on state sovereignty. Id. at 240. 
 98. Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 367 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  Breyer concluded by stating that 
the Court did “not honor federalist principles.” Id. 
 99. 137 S. Ct. 1421 (2017). 
 100. Id. at 1426. 
 101. In a short dissent, Justice Thomas argued that the FAA should not apply to 
proceedings in state courts. Id. at 1429–30 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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arbitration agreements for disfavored treatment and therefore violated the 
FAA.102 
The Court reasoned that the FAA preempts any rule that “covertly” 
accomplishes discrimination against arbitration by disfavoring contracts that 
have “defining features” of arbitration agreements.103  Here, the Court found 
that the Kentucky Supreme Court had adopted a legal rule “tailor-made” to 
apply to arbitration agreements.104 
By impeding the ability of “attorney[s]-in-fact” to enter into arbitration 
agreements, the Kentucky Supreme Court demonstrated a “hostility to 
arbitration”105 and disregarded the FAA’s requirement that courts “place 
arbitration agreements on equal footing with all other contracts.”106 
5.  Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis:  Reinforcing the Super-Statute Status 
of the Federal Arbitration Act 
The most recent decision to reinforce the broad scope of the FAA was a 
consolidated decision rendered in May 2018.  In Epic Systems Corp. v. 
Lewis,107 the Court held in a five-to-four decision that neither the FAA’s 
saving clause nor the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)108 superseded 
Congress’s intent in the FAA to enforce arbitration agreements.109 
The Court rejected the employees’ argument that the NLRA’s protection 
of concerted labor activities110 overrides the enforcement of individualized 
arbitration agreements.111  The Court reasoned that § 7 of the NLRA does 
not express approval or disapproval of arbitration and “does not even hint at 
a wish to displace” the FAA.112  The Court upheld the validity of 
individualized arbitration agreements given the amount of “strong[]” 
precedent and the absence of congressional action.113 
In her dissent, Justice Ginsburg referred to the Court’s decision as 
“egregiously wrong.”114  Ginsburg reviewed the FAA’s history, arguing that 
 
 102. Id. at 1425 (majority opinion). 
 103. Id. at 1426. 
 104. Id. at 1427. 
 105. Id. at 1427–28. 
 106. Id. at 1424 (quoting DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. 463, 465 (2015)). 
 107. 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018). 
 108. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2012). 
 109. Epic Sys., 138 S. Ct. at 1622, 1632. 
 110. 29 U.S.C. § 157.  Section 7 of the NLRA guarantees workers “the right to self-
organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through 
representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the 
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.” Id. 
 111. See Epic Sys., 138 S. Ct. at 1624. 
 112. Id.  Once again, the majority opinion ignores the canon that statutes enacted later in 
time control. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 66, at 136. 
 113. Epic Sys., 138 S. Ct. at 1628.  In his concurrence, Justice Thomas argued that the 
saving clause does not apply to nonenforcement of a contract on public policy grounds. Id. at 
1633 (Thomas, J., concurring).  Justice Thomas wrote a similar concurrence in Concepcion. 
See supra note 94. 
 114. Epic Sys., 138 S. Ct. at 1633 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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the FAA does not require suppression of workers’ collective-action rights.115  
Referencing the remarks of Representative Graham and Senator Thomas J. 
Walsh before the USAA’s enactment,116 Ginsburg stressed that Congress 
intended the USAA to apply to “voluntary, negotiated agreements” and that 
the Court’s “exorbitant application of the FAA” stretched the statute far 
beyond the contractual disputes it was intended to govern.117 
Ginsburg’s dissent also argued that invalidating mandatory arbitration here 
did not overrule precedential cases like Concepcion and Kindred Nursing 
because the NLRA does not discriminate against arbitration on its face or by 
“covert operation[s].”118  Ginsburg also argued that the FAA and NLRA 
could be read harmoniously.119 
Over the last twenty-eight years, the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the 
FAA has broadly increased its scope and replaced judicial access with 
arbitration for an estimated sixty million Americans.120  The FAA, as 
construed by the Supreme Court, requires arbitration of statutory claims that 
were created decades after the FAA was passed, such as claims under Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”)121 and the ADEA.122  Sexual 
harassment claims fall under Title VII, meaning that arbitration agreements 
are enforced for sexual harassment claims.123 
D.  The Impact of the #MeToo Movement and Time’s Up Campaign 
on Sexual Harassment Claims 
The #MeToo movement and Time’s Up campaign brought the widespread 
issue of sexual harassment into the national spotlight in late 2017.124  Under 
 
 115. See id. at 1643. 
 116. See id.; see also Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 125 (2001); Gilmer 
v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 39 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting 
Senator Walsh’s extended remarks at the 1923 Senate Judiciary Committee hearing:  “The 
trouble about the matter is that a great many of these contracts that are entered into are really 
not [voluntary] things at all. . . .  A man says, ‘These are our terms.  All right, take it or leave 
it.’  Well, there is nothing for the man to do except to sign it; and then he surrenders his right 
to have his case tried by the court, and has to have it tried before a tribunal in which he has no 
confidence at all.” (quoting Hearing, supra note 49, at 9)); supra note 87 and accompanying 
text (describing Representative Graham’s remarks). 
 117. See Epic Sys., 138 S. Ct. at 1643–44 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 118. Id. at 1646. 
 119. See id. at 1645.  The dissent also included information about the increase in 
employment arbitration clauses after Gilmer and Circuit City, stating that in 1992 only 2.1 
percent of nonunionized companies imposed mandatory arbitration agreements while the 
number increased to 53.9 percent in 2017. See id. at 1644. 
 120. COLVIN, supra note 12, at 2. 
 121. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2012). 
 122. See, e.g., Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991); see also supra 
Part I.C.1 (discussing Gilmer and the Supreme Court’s enforcement of arbitration for an 
ADEA claim). 
 123. Facts About Sexual Harassment, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, 
https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/publications/fs-sex.cfm [https://perma.cc/USV7-2YGS] (last 
visited Apr. 10, 2019). 
 124. Alix Langone, #MeToo and Time’s Up Founders Explain the Difference Between the 
2 Movements—and How They’re Alike, TIME (Mar. 22, 2018), http://time.com/5189945/ 
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Title VII, workplace sexual harassment125 claims are filed as discrimination 
claims with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).126  In 
fiscal year 2018,127 the number of sexual harassment claims filed with the 
EEOC increased by 13.6 percent compared to fiscal year 2017.128  This 
increase can be attributed to the rise of two groundbreaking women’s 
empowerment movements aimed at eradicating sexual harassment and sexual 
assault:  #MeToo and Time’s Up.129 
The #MeToo movement was originally inspired by activist Tarana 
Burke.130  In 2006, Burke started a nonprofit, with the motto “Me Too,” that 
focuses on helping victims of sexual harassment and assault.131  The #MeToo 
movement gained national attention after allegations of sexual assault and 
harassment by Harvey Weinstein broke in the New York Times.132  In 
solidarity with women speaking out against Weinstein, Hollywood actress 
Alyssa Milano posted on Twitter asking her followers to reply with “me too” 
if they had been sexually assaulted or harassed.133  Within twenty-four hours, 
the hashtag “#MeToo” appeared in more than 500,000 tweets and twelve 
million Facebook posts.134  The #MeToo movement launched an important 
 
whats-the-difference-between-the-metoo-and-times-up-movements/ [https://perma.cc/26S7-
5CF7]. 
 125. The EEOC defines “sexual harassment” as “unwelcome sexual advances, requests for 
sexual favors, and other verbal or physical harassment of a sexual nature.” Sexual Harassment, 
U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/types/ 
sexual_harassment.cfm [https://perma.cc/DW4G-GHNS] (last visited Apr. 10, 2019). 
 126. RAYMOND F. GREGORY, UNWELCOME AND UNLAWFUL:  SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE 
AMERICAN WORKPLACE 201 (2004).  An EEOC investigation of a discrimination charge 
generally ends with one of two findings:  “for cause” or “no cause.” Id.  “For cause” findings 
are those where there is reason to believe the employer has engaged in discrimination. Id.  
Such findings lead to further investigation and possibly litigation by the EEOC on behalf of 
the claimant. Id.  A “no cause” finding ends the EEOC’s involvement but leaves the claimant 
the option of going to court. Id.  Six months after filing a claim, an employee may demand a 
right-to-sue notice that the EEOC must issue even if it has concluded the investigation with a 
“no cause” finding. Id. at 202. 
 127. As a federal agency, the EEOC’s fiscal year begins on October 1, ends on September 
30, and is designated by the calendar year in which it ends. Glossary Term:  Fiscal 
Year, U.S. SENATE, https://www.senate.gov/reference/glossary_term/fiscal_year.htm 
[https://perma.cc/P234-YVQS] (last visited Apr. 10, 2019). 
 128. What You Should Know:  EEOC Leads the Way in Preventing Workplace Harassment, 
U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/ 
wysk/preventing-workplace-harassment.cfm [https://perma.cc/9AGU-7X2K] (last visited 
Apr. 10, 2019).  For a list of fiscal year 2018 EEOC litigation, see Litigation—FY 2018 
Harassment Filings, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, https://www.eeoc.gov/ 
eeoc/litigation/selected/2018harassment.cfm [https://perma.cc/KR6K-XEBH] (last visited 
Apr. 10, 2019). 
 129. See Langone, supra note 124. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Kara Fox & Jan Diehm, #MeToo’s Global Moment:  The Anatomy of a Viral 
Campaign, CNN (Nov. 9, 2017, 1:35 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2017/11/09/world/metoo-
hashtag-global-movement/index.html [https://perma.cc/5TU9-JBDX]; More Than 12M “Me 
Too” Facebook Posts, Comments, Reactions in 24 Hours, CBS NEWS (Oct. 17, 2017, 
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discussion regarding sexual harassment and became a global phenomenon.135  
Time magazine named “The Silence Breakers” as its 2017 “Person of the 
Year,” honoring all of the women and men involved in confronting their 
harassers.136 
The Time’s Up campaign, announced on January 1, 2018, is an “action-
orientated” extension of the #MeToo movement.137  Started by a group of 
over 300 women in Hollywood, the Time’s Up campaign focuses on 
promoting workplace equality and creating equal economic opportunities for 
women and people of color.138  Since its creation, the campaign has raised 
$24 million for a legal defense fund to help with legal and media 
assistance.139  As of March 1, 2019, the Time’s Up Legal Defense Fund 
received 4139 requests for assistance with sexual harassment claims.140 
Over a year after the #MeToo movement began, its “undeniable” impact 
on the number of reported EEOC sexual harassment claims is still 
palpable.141  As #MeToo went viral, traffic to the EEOC website spiked 
dramatically, increasing to 66,625 visitors from 30,000 the month before.142  
News of sexual harassment claims continues to break, and on September 25, 
2018, Bill Cosby’s sentence made him the first #MeToo-era perpetrator to be 
sent to prison.143  The widespread impact of the #MeToo movement and 
Time’s Up campaign demonstrates the pervasiveness of sexual harassment 
throughout the United States and a desire to act in response to this issue.144 
 
6:26 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/metoo-more-than-12-million-facebook-posts-
comments-reactions-24-hours/ [https://perma.cc/PZL7-4GXT]. 
 135. See Fox & Diehm, supra note 134. 
 136. See Langone, supra note 124. 
 137. See id.; see also Cara Buckley, Powerful Hollywood Women Unveil Anti-Harassment 
Action Plan, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 1, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/01/movies/times-
up-hollywood-women-sexual-harassment.html [https://perma.cc/T7G9-28A5]. 
 138. See Open Letter from Time’s Up, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 1, 2018), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
interactive/2018/01/01/arts/02women-letter.html [https://perma.cc/4AHX-ZQVX]. 
 139. TIME’S UP Legal Defense Fund, NAT’L WOMEN’S L. CTR., https://nwlc-
ciw49tixgw5lbab.stackpathdns.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/2019.03.04-Final_nwlc_ 
TimesUpOneSheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/5SNJ-ANEM] (last updated Mar. 1, 2019). 
 140. Id. 
 141. See Nigel Chiwaya, New Data on #MeToo’s First Year Shows ‘Undeniable’ Impact, 
NBC NEWS (Oct. 11, 2018, 1:54 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/new-data-
metoo-s-first-year-shows-undeniable-impact-n918821 [https://perma.cc/7WR7-5X8N]. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Jenny Jarvie, Led Away in Handcuffs, Bill Cosby Will Serve Three to 10 Years in 
Prison for Sexual Assault, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 25, 2018, 5:30 PM), https://www.latimes.com/ 
nation/la-na-bill-cosby-sentenced-20180925-story.html [https://perma.cc/W7R3-FK7K]; see 
also Anna North, Bill Cosby Is in Prison.  But the First Real #MeToo Trial Hasn’t Happened 
Yet, VOX (Oct. 1, 2018), https://www.vox.com/2018/10/1/17902810/bill-cosby-sentencing-
harvey-weinstein-larry-nassar [https://perma.cc/NNR7-2SDW]. 
 144. This Note focuses on prohibiting mandatory arbitration of sexual harassment claims.  
However, even supporters of legislative change in this area have voiced concerns that a focus 
on sexual harassment ignores intersectionality and other forms of discrimination and 
employment claims. See, e.g., Terri Gerstein, End Forced Arbitration for Sexual Harassment.  
Then Do More., N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 14, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/14/ 
opinion/arbitration-google-facebook-employment.html [https://perma.cc/5M8P-9FN8].  
Workplace violations of different types are often intertwined, and supporters of confronting a 
2019] MANDATORY ARBITRATION AND #METOO 2669 
II.  FEDERAL, STATE, AND CORPORATE RESPONSES TO MANDATORY 
ARBITRATION OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT CLAIMS 
The national spotlight on sexual harassment has translated into various 
attempts to prohibit or limit the application of mandatory arbitration clauses.  
This Part addresses federal, state, and corporate responses to mandatory 
arbitration of sexual harassment claims.  Part II.A discusses federal 
responses, including enacted and proposed legislation.  Part II.B first 
explores enacted state legislation that directly or covertly prohibits 
mandatory arbitration and then reviews a state bill that was vetoed because 
of anticipated federal preemption.  Part II.C discusses recent actions by 
corporations prohibiting mandatory arbitration of sexual harassment 
claims—some of which have been voluntary and others due to social 
pressure. 
A.  Federal Responses:  Enacted and Proposed Legislation 
Congress has expressed concern about mandatory arbitration clauses since 
the Supreme Court began to expand the scope of the FAA in Gilmer.  Within 
a few years of the Gilmer decision, the Senate considered legislation that 
would have amended the FAA and created exceptions for discrimination 
claims.145  This section explores various federal actions that were initiated to 
limit the application of the FAA on sexual harassment claims or prohibit 
mandatory arbitration in general. 
1.  The Franken Amendment:  Successfully Enacted Federal Legislation 
to Limit Mandatory Arbitration 
In December 2009, President Obama signed an appropriations bill for the 
Department of Defense (DOD), which included the “Franken 
Amendment.”146  With the exception of a national-security waiver, this 
amendment prohibits providing more than $1 million in federal funding to a 
contractor or subcontractor that requires employees to arbitrate claims arising 
under Title VII or any tort claims related to, or arising out of, sexual assault 
or sexual harassment.147  The Franken Amendment, which received little 
public attention, is the first, and only, piece of federal legislation to prevent 
employers from requiring mandatory arbitration for their employees.148 
 
broader scope of issues maintain that sexism, racism, and economic exploitation are 
“inseparable.” Id. 
 145. See Protection from Coercive Employment Agreements Act, S. 2012, 103d Cong. 
(1994). 
 146. Department of Defense Appropriation Act, 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-118, § 8116, 123 
Stat. 3409, 3454–55 (2009). 
 147. Id.  The Title VII provision includes discrimination claims and allows victims of 
assault or rape to sue the individual perpetrator and the perpetrator’s employer. Id.; see also 
Sam Stein, Franken’s Anti-Rape Amendment May Be Stripped by Senior Dem, Sources Say, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 18, 2010, 5:12 AM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/ 
10/22/frankens-anti-rape-amendm_n_329896.html [https://perma.cc/3XA4-QHNY]. 
 148. See Department of Defense Appropriation Act, 2010 § 8116, 123 Stat. at 3454–55. 
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When he introduced the amendment on the Senate floor, then–Democratic 
Senator Al Franken149 stated that his inspiration was the case of Jamie Leigh 
Jones, a former employee of defense contractor Kellogg Brown & Root 
(KBR).150  Jones alleged that she was gang-raped by coworkers in her 
employer-provided housing while working for KBR in Iraq.151  When Jones 
attempted to bring a suit against her employer, KBR sought to enforce the 
arbitration clause in her employment contract.152  Senator Franken argued 
that while arbitration is an “efficient forum” for business disputes, it is not 
appropriate for sexual assault and civil rights claims.153  Arbitration, 
according to Senator Franken, was inappropriate for these violations because 
it has limits—it occurs behind closed doors and therefore the public is not 
informed about recurring problems.154  Additionally, an arbitration decision 
does not establish precedent for future cases.155 
On October 6, 2009, the Senate voted to include the Franken Amendment 
in the appropriations bill.156  On the floor, then–Republican Senator Jeff 
Sessions, in opposition to the amendment, argued that the Supreme Court had 
already resolved that employment arbitration agreements were valid and 
“beneficial” in most cases.157  Senator Sessions argued that further methods 
for utilizing mediation and arbitration should be explored instead of 
eliminating arbitration altogether.158  In support of his argument, Senator 
Sessions stated that employees “tend to win” in arbitration as opposed to 
litigation.159  Additionally, he listed several advantages of arbitration, 
including the advantage, noted by Justice Anthony Kennedy in Circuit City, 
that arbitration agreements help parties avoid the high cost of litigation.160  
 
 149. Senator Franken resigned in December 2017 when faced with sexual misconduct 
allegations of his own. See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Yamiche Alcindor & Nicholas Fandos, Al 
Franken to Resign from Senate Amid Harassment Allegations, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 7, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/07/us/politics/al-franken-senate-sexual-harassment.html 
[https://perma.cc/5UH7-AG3R].  For more information on the controversy surrounding 
Franken’s resignation, see Laura McGann, The Still-Raging Controversy over Al Franken’s 
Resignation, Explained, VOX (May 21, 2018, 6:20 AM), https://www.vox.com/ 
2018/5/21/17352230/al-franken-accusations-resignation-democrats-leann-tweeden-kirsten-
gillibrand [https://perma.cc/85Y3-N7T8]. 
 150. 155 CONG. REC. 23,403 (2009). 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id.  Jones was able to bring her suit against KBR following litigation regarding 
enforcement of the arbitration provision.  But ultimately, the jury found for the defendant 
KBR. See Daniel Gilbert, Jury Favors KBR in Iraq Rape Trial, WALL ST. J. (July 9, 2011), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303365804576434301221391760 
[https://perma.cc/W6SX-FV96]. 
 153. 155 CONG. REC. 23,403 (2009). 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. 
 156. 155 CONG. REC. 23,562 (2009). 
 157. 155 CONG. REC. 23,558 (2009); see supra Parts I.A.1–2 (discussing the benefits and 
drawbacks of mandatory arbitration). 
 158. 155 CONG. REC. 23,558 (2009). 
 159. Id.  But see supra note 29 (discussing statistics that suggest employees are less 
successful in arbitration). 
 160. 155 CONG. REC. 23,558 (2009).  Senator Sessions also stated that invalidating 
employment agreements would violate the due process rights of both employers and 
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In response, Senator Franken stressed that the amendment did not seek to 
eliminate arbitration completely but would merely eliminate it in cases of 
rape or sexual assault.161 
Immediately preceding the vote, Senator Franken cited the National 
Alliance to End Sexual Violence’s view that it is “outrageous” to ask victims 
to enter into arbitration with a perpetrator or with a company that would not 
protect them.162  He concluded that victims of sexual assault and 
discrimination deserve the “basic right” to pursue “their day in court.”163  
Democratic Senator Bill Nelson, a cosponsor of the amendment, also spoke 
in support of the bill, noting that the amendment would close a “legal 
loophole” that prevented victims from obtaining justice.164 
In his final opposing statement, Senator Sessions stated that the DOD 
urged him to oppose the amendment.165  Senator Sessions also argued that 
the amendment was too broad because it went beyond issues of sexual assault 
and rape and eliminated arbitration for any claim under Title VII.166  Despite 
Senator Sessions’s opposition, the amendment passed by a vote of sixty-eight 
to thirty.167 
The Franken Amendment was itself amended during a conference 
negotiation between the defense appropriations committees of the House and 
Senate.168  The original Senate version did not include the $1 million contract 
threshold or the national-security waiver.169  These changes were 
incorporated following criticism from the Obama administration’s DOD, the 
chairman of the Senate Committee on Appropriations, and Senate 
Republicans.170  The DOD opposed the amendment and expressed concern 
 
employees and reiterated that employees could benefit from arbitration. Id. at 23,559.  Senator 
Franken responded that Congress may constitutionally condition the receipt of federal funds 
and has imposed conditions in the past to further policy objectives. Id.  Franken included a 
letter from three prominent constitutional scholars—Akhil Amar, Laurence Tribe, and Erwin 
Chemerinsky—in the record, which discussed the constitutionality of the “Franken 
Amendment.” Id.  Additionally, Senator Franken argued that the amendment supported due 
process rights by ensuring that defense contractors could no longer use fine print in contracts 
to deny victims “their day in court.” Id. at 23,560. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. at 23,561. 
 163. Id. at 23,562. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id.  The political affiliation for the vote was sixty-eight in favor (fifty-six Democrats, 
ten Republicans, and two independent senators) and thirty opposed (all Republicans).  Two 
senators did not vote. See id.; Roll Call Vote 111th Congress—1st Session, U.S. SENATE, 
https://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=111
&session=1&vote=00308#position [https://perma.cc/82SR-32H2] (last visited Apr. 10, 
2019). 
 168. See Stein, supra note 147. 
 169. 155 CONG. REC. 23,402 (2009) (providing the full text of the original Senate version 
of the Franken Amendment). 
 170. See Stein, supra note 147. 
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because “[e]nforcement would be problematic.”171  A White House 
spokesperson responded that the DOD’s opposition was overstated and that 
the Obama administration supported the “intent” of the Franken Amendment 
and was working to ensure that it would be enforceable.172  Critics of the 
Franken Amendment considered narrowing the scope of included claims.173  
However, attempts to remove the Title VII provision were met with public 
outcry, which likely helped the provision remain in the final bill.174 
The Franken Amendment has been reenacted each year and was included 
within the DOD’s $674.4 billion budget for fiscal year 2019.175  However, 
the Franken Amendment is limited in scope and does not prohibit a federal 
contractor from requiring employees to sign a mandatory arbitration 
agreement regarding other claims.176  The legislation also does not cover 
race, age, or disability discrimination claims.177 
2.  The Fair Pay and Safe Workplaces Executive Order:  A Revoked 
Attempt to Limit Mandatory Arbitration 
On July 31, 2014, President Obama signed Executive Order 13,673, the 
“Fair Pay and Safe Workplaces” (FPSW) order.178  This order was a response 
to the discovery that federal contracts worth millions of dollars had been 
awarded to companies with “rampant” labor law violations.179  The FPSW 
order required potential federal contractors and subcontractors to disclose 
labor law violations for the past three years.180  Additionally, for contracts 
valued over $1 million, the FPSW order prohibited mandatory arbitration for 
Title VII and specified tort claims related to, or arising out of, sexual assault 
 
 171. Ryan Grim, Defense Department Opposed Franken’s Anti-Rape Amendment, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 18, 2010, 5:12 AM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/ 
10/19/defense-department-oppose_n_326569.html [https://perma.cc/Z55E-85N3]. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. 
 175. See Department of Defense and Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education 
Appropriations Act, 2019 and Continuing Appropriations Act, 2019, Pub. L. No. 115-245, 
§ 8094, 132 Stat. 2981, 3022 (2018); see also President Signs Defense Package into Law, 
Enacts Most On-Time Spending Bills in Two Decades, U.S. SENATE COMMITTEE ON 
APPROPRIATIONS (Sept. 28, 2018), https://www.appropriations.senate.gov/news/president-
signs-defense-package-into-law-enacts-most-on-time-spending-bills-in-two-decades 
[https://perma.cc/UA8F-37BE]. 
 176. Department of Defense Appropriation Act, 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-118, § 8116, 123 
Stat. 3409, 3454–55 (2009). 
 177. See STONE & COLVIN, supra note 23, at 25–26.  Wage and hour claims under the Fair 
Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and claims based on state employment statutes are also not 
included. Id. 
 178. Exec. Order No. 13,673, 3 C.F.R. 283 (2014). 
 179. Mary Emily O’Hara, Trump Pulls Back Obama-Era Protections for Women Workers, 
NBC NEWS (Apr. 3, 2017, 6:23 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/trump-pulls-
back-obama-era-protections-women-workers-n741041 [https://perma.cc/6J6Z-BFU6].  The 
Government Accountability Office conducted this investigation in 2010. Id. 
 180. Exec. Order No. 13,673, 3 C.F.R. 283, 284–85 (2014). 
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or harassment.181  The Obama administration originally expressed concerns 
regarding the Franken Amendment, but the passage of the FPSW order 
indicated support for this approach.182 
The majority of the FPSW order, and the administrative rule that was 
promulgated pursuant to the order, never went into effect.183  A preliminary 
injunction partially enjoined the rule and accompanying guidance, including 
the prohibition on mandatory arbitration agreements.184  Additionally, on 
March 27, 2017, President Trump issued Executive Order 13,782, revoking 
the FPSW order.185  On the same day, President Trump also signed a 
resolution disapproving of the FPSW order’s rule186 under the Congressional 
Review Act (CRA).187  The repeal was part of the Trump administration’s 
campaign to revoke various Obama administration regulations, characterized 
as “overreaching federal rulemaking.”188 
Unlike the Franken Amendment, the FPSW order was subject to legal 
challenges based on its contradiction of the FAA.189  In October 2016, the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas held that the 
FPSW order and rule violated the FAA.190  The district court’s reasoning 
mirrored that of a prior Fifth Circuit opinion191:  when Congress passes 
legislation in an area, such as the FAA, an executive order to the contrary is 
 
 181. Id. at 289–90.  The FPSW order contained more exceptions than the Franken 
Amendment, such as exempting contractors and subcontractors with employees covered under 
a collective bargaining agreement. Id. at 290. 
 182. See Grim, supra note 171. 
 183. See Guidance for Executive Order 13673, “Fair Pay and Safe Workplaces,” 82 Fed. 
Reg. 51,358 (Nov. 6, 2017) (announcing the rescission of the Department of Labor’s 
guidance).  On August 25, 2016, the Federal Acquisition Regulatory (FAR) Council issued a 
final rule and the Department of Labor issued guidance based on the FPSW order. 48 C.F.R. 
pt. 22.20 (2017). 
 184. See generally Associated Builders & Contractors of Se. Tex. v. Rung, No. 1:16-CV-
425, 2016 WL 8188655 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 24, 2016). 
 185. Exec. Order No. 13,782, 3 C.F.R. 314 (2017). 
 186. Pub. L. No. 115-11, 131 Stat. 75 (2017).  The passage of Public Law 115-11 under 
the CRA gives Congress the ability to “fast-track” the reversal of regulations. See Eric Levitz, 
Trump Makes Labor-Law Violators Eligible for Federal Contracts Again, N.Y. MAG. (Mar. 
27, 2017), http://nymag.com/intelligencer/2017/03/trump-lets-federal-contractors-abuse-
their-workers-again.html [https://perma.cc/YBP4-P5G7].  The CRA requires a majority in 
both the House and Senate to strike down a federal regulation, and a subsequent executive 
order cannot reinstate the regulation without congressional approval. See id. 
 187. 5 U.S.C. § 801 (2012). 
 188. Michael Macagnone, Senate Tees Up Repeal of Fair Pay and Safe Workplaces Rule, 
LAW360 (Mar. 2, 2017, 5:30 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/897686/senate-tees-up-
repeal-of-fair-pay-and-safe-workplaces-rule [https://perma.cc/H6AA-2XE2].  In June 2018 
the Senate and House introduced bills with identical language to the repealed FPSW order 
prohibiting mandatory arbitration. See Fair Pay and Safe Workplaces Act of 2018, S. 3077, 
115th Cong. (2018); Workers’ Freedom to Negotiate Act of 2018, S. 3064, 115th Cong. 
(2018); Workers’ Freedom to Negotiate Act of 2018, H.R. 6080, 115th Cong. (2018).  
However, no further action occurred after these bills were referred to committee. 
 189. STONE & COLVIN, supra note 23, at 26. 
 190. Associated Builders & Contractors of Se. Tex. v. Rung, No. 1:16-CV-425, 2016 WL 
8188655, at *14 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 24, 2017). 
 191. Chamber of Commerce v. Reich, 74 F.3d 1322, 1324, 1339 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (holding 
that an executive order that conflicted with the NLRA was preempted by the legislation). 
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preempted.192  The Obama administration originally appealed the district 
court’s injunction, but the case was dismissed following Trump’s 
inauguration.193 
3.  The Arbitration Fairness Act:  A Broad Approach 
The proposed Arbitration Fairness Act (AFA) is a broad ban on mandatory 
arbitration agreements that has taken various forms over the years.194  
Generally, the AFA would prohibit mandatory arbitration agreements for 
employment, consumer, antitrust, and civil rights disputes.195  Sexual 
harassment claims are included under employment disputes.196 
First introduced by Democratic Representative Henry Johnson, Jr. in July 
2007,197 the AFA is often reintroduced in response to Supreme Court 
decisions regarding arbitration.198  For example, the 2011 AFA was 
introduced by Senator Franken and Representative Johnson in response to 
Concepcion.199  The 2018 AFA was introduced by Democratic Senator 
Richard Blumenthal the day after Epic Systems was decided.200  The 2018 
AFA had thirty-two cosponsors in the Senate, but it did not have enough 
support to pass within the 115th Congress.201  A House version of the AFA 
was also introduced and garnered the support of eighty-two cosponsors.202 
 
 192. See Associated Builders & Contractors, 2016 WL 8188655, at *14; see also Reich, 74 
F.3d at 1324. 
 193. See Order of Dismissal at 1, Associated Builders & Contractors, 2016 WL 8188655, 
ECF No. 39. 
 194. See, e.g., Arbitration Fairness Act of 2018, S. 2591, 115th Cong. (2018); Arbitration 
Fairness Act of 2011, S. 987, 112th Cong. (2011); Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007, H.R. 
3010, 110th Cong. (2007). 
 195. See S. 987 § 3. (“Notwithstanding any other provision of this title, no predispute 
arbitration agreement shall be valid or enforceable if it requires arbitration of an employment 
dispute, consumer dispute, or civil rights dispute.”). 
 196. See id. 
 197. H.R. 3010. 
 198. See S. 987; see also S. 2591. 
 199. See Christopher Drahozal, Concepcion and the Arbitration Fairness Act, 
SCOTUSBLOG (Sept. 13, 2011, 11:46 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/09/concepcion-
and-the-arbitration-fairness-act/ [https://perma.cc/F3EB-AKY9]. 
 200. S. 2591. 
 201. See Shane T. Roeber, Supreme Court Upholds Individual Proceedings in Arbitration 
Agreements—Hindering Class Actions, NAT’L L. REV. (June 19, 2018), 
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/supreme-court-upholds-individual-proceedings-
arbitration-agreements-hindering-class [https://perma.cc/QHV8-8KSQ].  The thirty-two 
cosponsors were all either Democratic or independent senators. See S. 2591—Arbitration 
Fairness Act of 2018:  Cosponsors, CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-
congress/senate-bill/2591/cosponsors [https://perma.cc/7K5V-C9EN] (last visited Apr. 10, 
2019). 
 202. Arbitration Fairness Act of 2017, H.R. 1374, 115th Cong. (2017).  The eighty-two 
cosponsors were all Democrats. See H.R. 1374—Arbitration Fairness Act of 2017:  
Cosponsors, CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/1374/ 
cosponsors [https://perma.cc/DQU4-VUFT] (last visited Apr. 10, 2019). 
2019] MANDATORY ARBITRATION AND #METOO 2675 
In February 2019, after Democrats won a majority of seats in the House,203 
the renamed Forced Arbitration Injustice Repeal (FAIR) Act, with identical 
language to the AFA, garnered 172 cosponsors.204  The FAIR Act was also 
introduced in the Senate and garnered thirty-four cosponsors.205 
4.  The Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Harassment Act: 
A Narrow Approach 
In December 2017, Democratic Senator Kirsten Gillibrand and 
Democratic Representative Cheri Bustos introduced the Ending Forced 
Arbitration of Sexual Harassment Act.206  This bill is narrower than the AFA 
and prohibits pre-dispute arbitration agreements for “sex discrimination 
dispute[s].”207  The House version of the bill garnered thirty-eight 
cosponsors208 and the Senate version had eighteen cosponsors.209  In contrast 
to the AFA, House and Senate sponsorship for the bill did not follow strict 
party lines, indicating stronger bipartisan support.210  For example, 
 
 203. See Susan Chira & Kate Zernike, Women Lead Parade of Victories to Help Democrats 
Win House, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 6, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/06/us/ 
politics/women-midterms-historic.html [https://perma.cc/7GDN-HWJY]. 
 204. See Forced Arbitration Injustice Repeal Act, H.R. 1423, 116th Cong. (2019); H.R. 
1423—FAIR Act:  Cosponsors, CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-
congress/house-bill/1423/cosponsors [https://perma.cc/RR5X-FMVA] (last visited Apr. 10, 
2019). 
 205. See Forced Arbitration Injustice Repeal Act, S. 610, 116th Cong. (2019); S. 610—
FAIR Act:  Cosponsors, CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/ 
senate-bill/610/cosponsors [https://perma.cc/Z3LQ-7R5T] (last visited Apr. 10, 2019). 
 206. See Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Harassment Act, H.R. 4734, 115th Cong. 
(2017); Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Harassment Act, S. 2203, 115th Cong. (2017).  
Senator Gillibrand stated that this bill was inspired by conversations with countless employees 
who made it clear that mandatory arbitration clauses were a major impediment to justice for 
sexual harassment claims. Janaki Chadha, Gillibrand Calls on Congress to Pass Legislation 
on Workplace Sexual Harassment, POLITICO (Jan. 26, 2018, 2:48 PM), 
https://www.politico.com/states/new-york/albany/story/2018/01/26/senator-gillibrand-calls-
on-congress-to-pass-legislation-on-workplace-sexual-harassment-217138 [https://perma.cc/ 
54EX-VC5P].  On February 28, 2019, this legislation was reintroduced by Representative 
Bustos, but it only garnered three cosponsors. See Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual 
Harassment Act of 2019, H.R. 1443, 116th Cong. (2019); H.R. 1443—Ending Forced 
Arbitration of Sexual Harassment Act of 2019:  Cosponsors, CONGRESS.GOV, 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/1443/cosponsors [https://perma.cc/ 
6D66-J4JU] (last visited Apr. 10, 2019).  However, a related bill that prohibits mandatory 
arbitration on a broader scale, the FAIR Act, was introduced in the House on the same day 
and received 172 cosponsors. See supra notes 203–04 and accompanying text. 
 207. See H.R. 4734 § 2; S. 2203 § 2. 
 208. See H.R. 4734—Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Harassment Act of 2017:  
Cosponsors, CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/4734/ 
cosponsors [https://perma.cc/9Q7J-NR9X] (last visited Apr. 10, 2019). 
 209. See S. 2203—Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Harassment Act of 2017:  
Cosponsors, CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/senate-bill/2203/ 
cosponsors [https://perma.cc/C9PH-JSF2] (last visited Apr. 10, 2019). 
 210. The Senate bill had three Republican and fifteen Democratic cosponsors. See id.  The 
House bill had eight Republican and thirty Democratic cosponsors. See H.R. 4734—Ending 
Forced Arbitration of Sexual Harassment Act of 2017:  Cosponsors, supra note 208. 
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Republican Senator Lindsey Graham introduced the bill alongside Senator 
Gillibrand.211 
Initial support for this legislation extended beyond Congress.  The 
attorneys general212 of all fifty states, the District of Columbia, and five U.S. 
territories sent a letter to Congress in support of the bill.213  The letter called 
on Congress to pass “appropriately-tailored legislation” that would ensure 
that sexual harassment victims have access to the judicial system.214  This 
bipartisan effort, led by Florida Attorney General Pam Bondi (a Republican) 
and North Carolina Attorney General Josh Stein (a Democrat),215 represented 
the first time in a decade that all fifty-six attorneys general signed a letter to 
Congress.216 
The letter recognized that arbitration agreements are often buried in “fine 
print” and employees often do not understand the effect of mandatory 
arbitration until they attempt to bring a sexual harassment claim.217  Further, 
the letter stated that secrecy requirements in arbitration “disserve” the 
public’s interests.218 
Shortly after the letter from the attorneys general, Representative Bustos 
wrote an open letter to Paul Ryan, then the Republican Speaker of the House, 
 
 211. Jacqueline Thomsen, AGs Demand Congress End Mandatory Arbitration in Sexual 
Harassment Cases, HILL (Feb. 13, 2018, 6:33 PM), https://thehill.com/regulation/ 
administration/373715-all-us-ags-demand-congress-end-mandatory-arbitration-in-sexual 
[https://perma.cc/5HSM-PR2P].  Senator Graham stressed that the Ending Forced Arbitration 
of Sexual Harassment Act would create incentives to change the workplace to a “less hostile 
and more respectful” environment and called on the U.S. Chamber of Commerce to endorse 
the bill because it was in businesses’ best interest. Press Release, U.S. Senator Lindsey 
Graham, Graham, Gillibrand Announce Bipartisan Legislation to Help Prevent Sexual 
Harassment in the Workplace (Dec. 6, 2017), https://www.lgraham.senate.gov/ 
public/index.cfm/2017/12/graham-gillibrand-announce-bipartisan-legislation-to-help-
prevent-sexual-harassment-in-the-workplace [https://perma.cc/DT9L-3272]. 
 212. Attorneys general are considered the “top legal officers of their state or territory.” 
State Attorneys General, USA.GOV, https://www.usa.gov/state-attorney-general 
[https://perma.cc/3P6F-4Y7P] (last visited Apr. 10, 2019). 
 213. Letter from Nat’l Ass’n of Att’ys Gen. to Paul Ryan, Speaker, U.S. House of 
Representatives, et al. (Feb. 12, 2018), http://www.naag.org/assets/redesign/files/sign-on-
letter/Final%20Letter%20-%20NAAG%20Sexual%20Harassment%20Mandatory%20 
Arbitration.pdf [https://perma.cc/RU9M-BJCH]; see also Emily Peck, All 50 State AGs 
Demand an End to ‘Culture Of Silence’ Surrounding Sexual Harassment, HUFFINGTON POST 
(Feb. 13, 2018, 4:58 PM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/attorneys-general-forced-
arbitration_us_5a83484fe4b0cf06751f5abe [https://perma.cc/SG5H-XWHX]. 
 214. See Letter from Nat’l Ass’n of Attorneys Gen. to Paul Ryan, Speaker, U.S. House of 
Representatives, et al., supra note 213. 
 215. See Thomsen, supra note 211; see also Press Release, Att’y Gen. Pam Bondi, Attorney 
General Bondi Leads Bipartisan Coalition of All 56 US AGs Urging Congress to Help Protect 
Employees from Sexual Harassment (Feb. 12, 2018), https://web.archive.org/web/ 
20180320091135/http://www.myfloridalegal.com/newsrel.nsf/newsreleases/8EDF0FD736B
B9D8B852582320063232E [https://perma.cc/6W3Z-WLS8]. 
 216. See Thomsen, supra note 211. 
 217. See Letter from Nat’l Ass’n of Attorneys Gen. to Paul Ryan, Speaker, U.S. House of 
Representatives, et al., supra note 213. 
 218. Id. 
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urging him to call for a vote, but no further congressional action occurred.219  
This inaction may have been due to quiet lobbying against the legislation by 
business leaders who were hesitant to publicly denounce it for fear of 
criticism that they were silencing victims of sexual harassment.220 
B.  State Responses:  Covert, Explicit, and Third-Party Action 
Thirty-two states introduced bills inspired by #MeToo and Time’s Up in 
2017 and 2018.221  Some states explicitly prohibited mandatory arbitration 
for sexual harassment claims while others pursued a more “covert” or third-
party approach.  Any prohibition or limitation on mandatory arbitration for 
sexual harassment claims remains in effect until a law is challenged in 
court.222  The legislative history of these bills indicates an awareness that a 
court would likely find that these statutes prohibiting mandatory arbitration 
are preempted by the FAA. 
1.  Washington:  A Covert Approach to Limiting Mandatory Arbitration 
In 2018, Washington State enacted Senate Bill (SB) 6313,223 which 
addresses an employee’s right to file a complaint or cause of action under 
Washington or federal antidiscrimination laws.224  The law states that an 
“employment contract or agreement is . . . void and unenforceable if it 
requires an employee to waive the employee’s right to publicly pursue a 
[sexual harassment] cause of action . . . or if it requires an employee to 
resolve claims of discrimination in a dispute resolution process that is 
confidential.”225  While mandatory arbitration is not explicitly referenced 
within the statute’s text, forced arbitration falls squarely under the waiver of 
employee rights referenced in the law. 
On January 24, 2018, the Washington Senate Labor and Commerce 
Committee held a public hearing on three bills regarding sexual harassment 
 
 219. See Thomsen, supra note 211; see also Press Release, Cheri Bustos, Open Letter:  
Speaker Ryan, You Have the Power to Help End Sexual Harassment in the Workplace (Feb. 
28, 2018), https://bustos.house.gov/open-letter-speaker-ryan-power-help-end-sexual-
harassment-workplace/ [https://perma.cc/DQ3H-9FX6]. 
 220. Marina Fang, Business Groups Might Be Quietly Killing a Bill That Would Bring 
Sexual Abuse Claims to Light, HUFFINGTON POST (May 17, 2018, 4:02 PM), 
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/forced-arbitration-sexual-harassment_us_5afda846e4 
b0a59b4e019e0a [https://perma.cc/7CXW-YYVA]. 
 221. Porter Wells, States Take Up #MeToo Mantle in Year After Weinstein, BLOOMBERG 
NEWS (Oct. 3, 2018), https://www.bna.com/states-metoo-mantle-n73014482949/ 
[https://perma.cc/6TT6-MZJL]. 
 222. See Michael P. Wissa, New York State and City Raise Bar for Employers in Handling 
Sexual Harassment Allegations, NAT’L L. REV. (Oct. 1, 2018), http://www.natlawreview.com/ 
article/new-york-state-and-city-raise-bar-employers-handling-sexual-harassment-allegations 
[https://perma.cc/CRB4-4S47]; see also New York State Passes Significant Sexual 
Harassment Legislation, SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP (Apr. 23, 2018), 
https://www.sullcrom.com/blogs-new-york-state-passes-significant-sexual-harassment-
legislation [https://perma.cc/T83Q-LXUZ]. 
 223. S. 6313, 65th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2018) (substitute Senate bill). 
 224. Id. 
 225. WASH. REV. CODE § 49.44.085 (2019). 
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of employees.226  Discussing these bills, the chair of the committee and the 
bill’s sponsor, Democratic Senator Karen Keiser, stated that SB 6313 was the 
“thorniest” bill of the three because federal law preempts state regulation of 
mandatory arbitration agreements.227  Experts in the field spoke to the 
committee, providing support for the bill and discussing concerns that the bill 
was preempted and could negatively impact workers subject to other types 
of unlawful harassment or discrimination.228 
The public hearing on SB 6313 indicates an awareness of the preemption 
issue and belief that the bill would withstand a preemption challenge.  This 
belief is likely unfounded.  Waiving the right to publicly pursue a cause of 
action is a “defining feature” of arbitration agreements.229  If challenged, this 
statute would likely be preempted on the same grounds as the statute at issue 
in Kindred Nursing—both statutes disfavor arbitration agreements.230 
However, the part of the Washington law that voids agreements requiring 
confidentiality for discrimination claims would likely survive a preemption 
challenge if severed from the rest of the text.231  Confidentiality is not 
required in arbitration, and the FAA is silent on the issue.  Even if SB 6313 
is invalidated, another newly enacted Washington law prohibits employers 
from conditioning employment on an agreement that prevents disclosure of 
sexual harassment in the workplace.232 
2.  New York:  An Explicit Approach to Limiting Mandatory Arbitration 
On April 12, 2018, Democratic Governor Andrew Cuomo signed New 
York’s 2018–2019 state budget, which included SB 7507 Part KK,233 a 
provision prohibiting arbitration agreements for sexual harassment claims.234  
This law defines “prohibited clause[s]” as any provision in an agreement that 
 
 226. See Hearing on S. 5996, S. 6313, and S. 6471 Before the S. Labor & Commerce 
Comm., 65th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Jan. 24, 2018) (statement of Sen. Keiser) (video and unofficial 
transcript available at https://www.tvw.org/watch/?eventID=2018011337 [https://perma.cc/ 
VG7U-KWT9]). 
 227. Id. 
 228. Id.  These experts included members of the Washington Employment Lawyers 
Association and Washington Coalition of Sexual Assault Programs. See id.  The bill was 
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requires mandatory arbitration to resolve sexual harassment claims.235  The 
law states, “Except where inconsistent with federal law, . . . prohibited 
clause[s] . . . shall be null and void.”236 
This provision was not part of the original bill and was added as part of 
Governor Cuomo’s “women’s agenda.”237  Floor debate on the amended 
version addressed the preemption issue.238  Republican Senator Catharine 
Young, then the chair of the Senate Finance Committee, acknowledged that 
federal law preempts any state law that treats arbitration less favorably than 
other agreements.239  When asked what protections the provision offered, 
Senator Young replied that some “extra protections” may exist, but she did 
not provide specifics.240  Democratic Senator Liz Krueger, then the ranking 
member of the Senate Finance Committee, pointed out that the provision did 
“not appear” to provide any new protections.241 
The New York law includes the language:  “Except where inconsistent 
with federal law.”242  This phrase sets the language apart from similar statutes 
and, combined with the floor debate, strongly suggests that the legislature 
expects preemption.243  New York’s statute explicitly targets mandatory 
arbitration and therefore disfavors arbitration.244  This goes against the long 
history of Supreme Court cases interpreting the FAA.245  It is possible that, 
if challenged, the statute would be upheld for companies operating solely in 
New York because intrastate companies are not subject to the FAA.246  
However, this would severely limit the provision’s impact.247 
The New York law also contains a provision that prohibits nondisclosure 
agreements.248  It states that for any claim resolution with a “factual 
foundation” involving sexual harassment, “no employer . . . shall have the 
authority to include . . . any term or condition that would prevent the 
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 238. N.Y. STATE SENATE, STENOGRAPHIC REC., 241st Leg., Reg. Sess., at 1850–51 (Mar. 
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 240. Id. 
 241. Id. 
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disclosure of the underlying facts and circumstances to the claim or action 
unless the condition of confidentiality is the complainant’s preference.”249  
This prohibition of nondisclosure agreements applies to all settlements, 
agreements, or claim resolutions.250  By prohibiting the nondisclosure of 
underlying facts, the bill allows the disclosure of the perpetrator’s identity 
while keeping the settlement amount confidential.251 
3.  California:  A Veto in Anticipation of Preemption 
The California State Legislature passed Assembly Bill (AB) 3080252 in 
August 2018, but it was vetoed by then-Governor Jerry Brown, a Democrat, 
in September 2018.253  AB 3080 did not explicitly mention mandatory 
arbitration, but it prohibited an employee from having to “waive any right, 
forum, or procedure for a violation of any provision of the California Fair 
Employment and Housing Act.”254  Discrimination claims, including sexual 
harassment, fall under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act.255  
Proponents of AB 3080 argued that the bill was “carefully crafted so as not 
to run afoul” of Supreme Court precedent.256  A report on the bill from 
California’s Office of Senate Floor Analyses specifically referenced 
Concepcion and Epic Systems and considered the “lengthy and extensive 
history” favoring enforcement of arbitration agreements.257 
Governor Brown vetoed AB 3080 because he believed that it “plainly” 
violated the FAA.258  His veto message referenced “recent court decisions 
that invalidated state policies which unduly impeded arbitration.”259  Quoting 
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Employment and Housing Act . . . including the right to file and pursue a civil action or a 
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 255. See California Fair Employment and Housing Act, CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 12900–
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 256. See OFFICE OF SENATE FLOOR ANALYSES, THIRD, Assemb. B. 3080, 2017–2018 Reg. 
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 258. See Letter from Governor Edmund G. Brown Jr. to the Members of the Cal. State 
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Kindred Nursing, Governor Brown stated that a rule “selectively” 
invalidating agreements as “improperly formed” is preempted by the FAA, 
just like a rule “selectively refusing” to enforce a valid arbitration agreement 
is preempted.260  AB 3080 had passed the state assembly by forty-seven votes 
to twenty-five and the state senate by twenty-six votes to twelve.261  While 
the votes were close to the two-thirds needed to override a veto,262 the lack 
of a vote to override the veto likely indicates that the legislature expected 
both the governor’s veto and federal preemption. 
The same day that Governor Brown vetoed AB 3080, he signed SB 820, 
the Stand Together Against Non-Disclosures (STAND) Act,263 which 
prohibits nondisclosure agreements for factual information in sexual 
harassment cases.264  The STAND Act requires disclosure of a perpetrator’s 
identity but does not prohibit nondisclosure agreements regarding the 
settlement amount.265  The law applies to claims filed in a civil action or a 
complaint filed in an administrative action; any settlements made before 
filing such claims are not subject to the same nondisclosure prohibition.266  
With a senate vote of thirty to eight and an assembly vote of fifty-six to 
nineteen, SB 820 passed with a larger majority than AB 3080.267 
Senator Connie Leyva, the bill’s sponsor, argued that nondisclosure 
agreements in sexual harassment claims “serve one primary purpose”:  
keeping sexual predators out of the public eye.268  Senator Leyva also 
stressed that the benefits of nondisclosure agreements were retained under 
SB 820 because some victims prefer to keep their identities confidential.269 
The governor’s veto of AB 3080 and signing of SB 820 occurred on 
September 30, 2018, making these bills some of the first pieces of legislation 
to be considered after Epic Systems.270  However, Epic Systems likely had 
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little to no impact on the governor’s decisions.  SB 820 is not subject to the 
FAA because it does not address arbitration,271 and Governor Brown cited 
Kindred Nursing, not Epic Systems, to support his veto of AB 3080.272 
4.  Massachusetts:  A Side-Door Approach 
As an alternative to prohibiting mandatory arbitration, one state has 
proposed legislation to empower the state attorney general’s office to 
investigate sexual harassment.  In January 2018, Massachusetts proposed 
House Bill (HB) 4323273 to enhance investigations into claims of sexual 
harassment and discrimination.274  HB 4323 would empower the attorney 
general to bring an action on behalf of the state against a person or company 
whenever the attorney general has reason to believe that a person or entity is 
engaged in sexual harassment and the proceeding would be in the public 
interest.275 
Supreme Court precedent allows third parties to pursue judicial relief on 
behalf of an employee.  In EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc.,276 the Supreme Court 
held six to three that the EEOC was not prohibited from pursuing a 
discrimination claim even though the employee signed an arbitration 
agreement.277  The FAA does not mention enforcement by public agencies 
and does not place restrictions on a nonparty’s choice to pursue a claim.278  
The Court reasoned that, while a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration 
exists, nothing in the FAA authorizes a court to compel arbitration that is not 
covered in an agreement.279 
In Waffle House, the Court recognized that Congress directed the EEOC, 
a public agency, to exercise Title VII enforcement, remedies, and 
procedures.280  The Supreme Court allowed the EEOC to pursue the claim, 
deferring to Congress’s clear intent that the EEOC be “the master of its own 
case.”281  The Massachusetts state legislature, through HB 4323, similarly 
empowered the attorney general, in her or his public enforcement capacity, 
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to be the “master” of pursuing sexual harassment cases.282  On one hand, if 
HB 4323 is passed it may be upheld based on the legislature’s clear intent 
and the attorney general’s status as a third party who is unrestricted by the 
party’s arbitration agreement.283  On the other hand, the law may be 
preempted because state public enforcement agencies may not receive the 
same level of deference as the EEOC, a federal agency that was created based 
on a clear congressional intent.  Overall, a court may uphold the statute due 
to federalism concerns about impinging on states’ rights to enforce their own 
laws through the attorney general.284 
C.  Corporate Responses:  The Tech Industry Leads the Charge 
and the Impact of Social Pressure 
With the national spotlight still on sexual harassment claims, companies 
are waiving mandatory arbitration clauses for employees.285  Microsoft 
became the first Fortune 100 company to publicly endorse the proposed 
Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Harassment Act.286  Microsoft also 
announced that, instead of waiting for the legislation to pass, any mandatory 
arbitration agreements in employee contracts were waived for sexual 
harassment claims, effective immediately.287  Microsoft’s endorsement of 
the Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Harassment Act exemplifies the 
willingness of some companies to proactively prohibit mandatory arbitration 
of sexual harassment claims.288  Other companies have followed suit, either 
in voluntary support or as a result of employee dissatisfaction and social 
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pressure.289  In May 2018, Uber decided to waive mandatory arbitration of 
sexual harassment claims after over a dozen women sued the company for 
sexual harassment and sexual assault.290  Lyft followed suit, voluntarily 
waiving mandatory arbitration clauses and removing confidentiality 
requirements for sexual harassment claims.291  In November 2018, Google 
announced a mandatory arbitration waiver following a 20,000-employee 
walkout protesting the company’s handling of previous sexual misconduct 
allegations.292  Facebook, eBay, and Airbnb quickly followed Google’s 
lead.293  Airbnb also waived mandatory arbitration for all discrimination 
claims, including those involving sexual harassment, race, gender, religion, 
or age.294  In February 2019, Google announced that it would no longer 
enforce mandatory arbitration provisions for employment disputes with any 
employees, including temporary staff, contract workers, and vendors.295 
While the tech industry has taken the lead regarding private action, the 
pressure to waive mandatory arbitration for sexual harassment claims has 
expanded to other industries.  Law firms have also been subject to intense 
social pressure to remove mandatory arbitration clauses.296  Several law 
firms announced that they would remove such clauses for summer associates 
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following a social media campaign criticizing the practice.297  Law students 
called on classmates to boycott firms during the recruiting season if the firm 
included mandatory arbitration for summer associates.298  Following the 
proposed boycott, additional firms removed their mandatory arbitration 
clauses, further demonstrating the impact of social pressure in this area.299 
III.  FEDERAL, STATE, AND THIRD-PARTY OPTIONS TO PROHIBIT 
MANDATORY ARBITRATION FOR SEXUAL HARASSMENT CLAIMS 
The Supreme Court’s “predilection for arbitration is unambiguous.”300  
The Supreme Court is perceived as increasingly pro-business, and Trump-
appointed Justices Neil Gorsuch and Brett Kavanaugh are expected to 
continue this trend.301  Based on the Court’s current makeup, it is unlikely to 
limit the reach of the FAA.302  However, as discussed in Part II, proposed 
federal and state legislation have targeted mandatory arbitration for sexual 
harassment claims.303 
This Part argues that immediate action is necessary to restore access to the 
judicial system for victims of sexual harassment.  Part III.A argues that 
federal action is required to prohibit mandatory arbitration for sexual 
harassment claims because state actions are likely preempted by the FAA.  
Part III.A also argues that despite preemption, states should continue to pass 
legislation to increase social pressure on Congress and corporations.  Part 
III.B explores alternative ways to attack mandatory arbitration for sexual 
harassment claims by empowering attorneys general to pursue claims, 
encouraging companies to waive mandatory arbitration for sexual 
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harassment claims and prohibiting nondisclosure agreements for sexual 
harassment settlements, unless requested by the claimant. 
A.  Federal Action Is Required Because State Action Is Likely Preempted 
The rise in EEOC claims and the number of claims filed with the Time’s 
Up Defense Fund are strong indicators of the public’s current desire to pursue 
claims of sexual harassment.304  Mandatory arbitration results in fewer 
claims, with lower chances of success and lower damages.305  Additionally, 
dissenting opinions in Supreme Court cases that interpret the FAA provide a 
strong argument that the FAA was never meant to apply to employment 
contracts.306  However, based on the Supreme Court’s FAA analysis, 
mandatory arbitration extends to sexual harassment claims and state action 
to the contrary is likely preempted.307  Congress should therefore create a 
federal exception to the FAA, either broadly with the FAIR Act308 or 
narrowly with the Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Harassment Act.309 
Congressional action is not subject to preemption challenges because later 
federal statutes control previous statutes.  Additionally, public support for the 
proposed Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Harassment Act is evident.  
For example, the numerous proposed state statutes prohibiting mandatory 
arbitration for sexual harassment claims suggest a strong desire for Congress 
to create a sexual harassment exception to the FAA.310  The #MeToo 
movement and Time’s Up campaign are not fading away and Congress 
cannot ignore the national spotlight on the pervasiveness of sexual 
harassment across industries.311  Passing the Ending Forced Arbitration of 
Sexual Harassment Act would send a strong message that Congress is 
responsive to public concerns about sexual harassment and that arbitration is 
not an appropriate forum for such claims.312 
Congress should consider expanding the Franken Amendment if the 
Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Harassment Act does not receive 
enough bipartisan support.313  The Franken Amendment continues to be 
reenacted with each annual DOD budget.314  The continued reenactment of 
the Franken Amendment shows a bipartisan acceptance of this approach that 
could be expanded to other federal budgets and eventually to all government 
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contracts.315  Re-legislating the Franken Amendment’s limit on mandatory 
arbitration each year is not as impactful or permanent as passing the Ending 
Forced Arbitration of Sexual Harassment Act, but this approach may be the 
only way to maintain bipartisan support. 
A step towards expanding the Franken Amendment to all government 
contracts could be accomplished by passing the Fair Pay and Safe Work Act 
of 2018 (“FPSW Act”).316  Approximately twenty-eight million employees 
currently work for federal contractors.317  The proposed FPSW Act would 
prohibit mandatory arbitration for new contracts worth more than 
$500,000—a lower threshold than the $1 million threshold in the FPSW 
order,318 which would increase the number of employees covered by the 
prohibition.319 
States should also continue to pass legislation that prohibits mandatory 
arbitration for sexual harassment claims.  Statutes with explicit language, 
such as New York’s SB 7507, are almost certain to be preempted by the FAA 
if passed and challenged in court.320  However, some protections may still be 
offered for employees of intrastate businesses.321  Additionally, each enacted 
or publicized statute brings this issue to the public’s attention and increases 
pressure on Congress and companies to act. 
The proactive state approach of limiting mandatory arbitration for sexual 
harassment claims conveys a powerful message to Congress.322  
Additionally, state statutes remain valid until challenged in court.323  In the 
wake of #MeToo and Time’s Up, employers may be hesitant to challenge 
statutes for fear of social backlash.324  Once challenged, the state statutes face 
an uphill battle to overcome the argument that they are preempted by the 
FAA.325  However, relevant Supreme Court dissents, especially Justice 
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Ginsburg’s recent dissent in Epic Systems, lay out a method for interpreting 
statutes without conflicting with the FAA.326 
B.  Alternative Options for Indirectly Attacking Mandatory Arbitration 
In the absence of federal legislation, states may still act indirectly to limit 
the impact of mandatory arbitration.  Such side-door methods focus on 
empowering third parties, whether state agencies or companies, to bring 
enforcement actions and thus ensure judicial access for sexual harassment 
claims.327  Additionally, states should prohibit problematic aspects of 
mandatory arbitration, such as nondisclosure agreements.  These actions are 
not in conflict with the FAA and therefore are not subject to preemption.328 
1.  Encouraging Third-Party Action:  State Attorneys General and 
Corporate Empowerment 
Third-party action should be encouraged to combat mandatory arbitration 
for sexual harassment claims. 
By empowering attorneys general to directly pursue sexual harassment 
claims, states bypass mandatory arbitration provisions.329  The letter to 
Congress signed by all fifty-six attorneys general indicates an overwhelming 
interest in limiting mandatory arbitration for sexual harassment claims.330  
The empowerment of attorneys general ensures access to the judicial system 
for victims of sexual harassment, which the letter describes as “a fundamental 
right of all Americans.”331 
Massachusetts should pass the pending bill332 to empower its attorney 
general, and other states should follow suit.333  Allowing state actors to 
pursue sexual harassment claims, despite the existence of a valid arbitration 
agreement between the employer and the employee, would begin to limit the 
impact of mandatory arbitration agreements.334  Additionally, empowering 
attorneys general to pursue sexual harassment claims returns some power to 
the states, power the FAA currently restricts with its broad preemption 
scope.335 
Second, social pressure on corporations should not be underestimated.336  
More companies should be encouraged to follow the lead of Microsoft and 
Google and waive mandatory arbitration clauses for employee sexual 
 
 326. See supra Part I.C.5. 
 327. See supra Parts II.B.4, II.C. 
 328. See supra Parts II.B.4, II.C. 
 329. See supra Part II.B.4. 
 330. See Letter from Nat’l Ass’n of Attorneys Gen. to Paul Ryan, Speaker, U.S. House of 
Representatives, et al., supra note 213. 
 331. See id. 
 332. H.R. 3312, 191st Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2019). 
 333. See supra Part II.B.4. 
 334. See supra Part II.B.4. 
 335. See supra Part II.B.4; see also supra note 97 and accompanying text. 
 336. See supra Part II.C. 
2019] MANDATORY ARBITRATION AND #METOO 2689 
harassment claims.337  Ideally, companies will voluntarily waive these 
agreements.  However, public pressure has proven effective in this area.338  
Google and top law firms changed their practices following social 
pressure.339  Additionally, CBS’s board of directors announced in December 
2018 that it would deny its ex-CEO $120 million in exit pay after an 
investigation into allegations of sexual harassment and assault.340  The board 
announced its decision days after information leaked about a $9.5 million 
sexual harassment settlement between CBS and Eliza Dushku.341  The CBS 
board referenced its investigation as the primary consideration in denying the 
exit pay, but the board was likely influenced by public concerns after a year 
of sexual harassment allegations.342 
2.  The State “Side-Door” Approach:  Prohibiting 
Nondisclosure Agreements 
States should enact legislation to prohibit nondisclosure agreements in 
settlements related to claims of sexual harassment. 
Nondisclosure agreements are criticized for creating a culture of 
impunity343 and for being susceptible to misuse by perpetrators to evade 
accountability.344  The case of Harvey Weinstein offers a poignant example 
of the lasting harm nondisclosure agreements may cause to both victims and 
the public.345  Nondisclosure agreements are not subject to the FAA.346  
States, therefore, may enact statutes that prohibit the most nefarious 
consequences of nondisclosure agreements, while protecting settlement 
benefits that sexual harassment victims may desire.347  Some victims of 
sexual harassment seek nondisclosure agreements because they believe such 
agreements will protect them from unwanted negative attention and 
retaliation.348  Additionally, there is a concern that, without nondisclosure 
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agreements, settlement amounts will decrease.349  States have already 
incorporated statutes that address these concerns by allowing both 
nondisclosure agreements when requested by the claimant and confidential 
settlement amounts.350  Laws that make perpetrators’ names public while 
keeping settlement amounts confidential still incentivize employers to settle 
and put the public on notice regarding perpetrators’ identities.  Current laws 
vary in how broadly they prohibit nondisclosure agreements.351  For 
example, New York’s statute applies to all settlements, while California’s 
only applies to settlements of civil suits.352  To protect the maximum number 
of victims, states should follow New York’s lead and use the broadest 
enacted statutes as a model for legislation.353 
CONCLUSION 
In the three months following the outpouring of sexual assault allegations 
against Harvey Weinstein, nearly one hundred “powerful people” were 
accused of sexual harassment—averaging one person every twenty hours.354  
Victims of sexual harassment should have the option to pursue litigation if 
they so choose.  Arbitration may have benefits within a commercial context, 
but the limitations of arbitrating sexual harassment claims are clear. 
The public outrage over the enforcement of mandatory arbitration 
agreements for sexual harassment claims continues over a year after the 
#MeToo movement began.355  However, the Supreme Court is unlikely to 
break its twenty-eight-year trend of expanding the scope of the FAA.  
Therefore, it is up to Congress to pass legislation to ensure that victims of 
sexual harassment receive their day in court.  In the absence of congressional 
action, states must continue to pass legislation prohibiting mandatory 
arbitration of sexual harassment claim in the hope of pressuring Congress 
and corporations to act.  Finally, as an alternative option, state “side-door” 
 
 349. See id. 
 350. In addition to the examples of Washington, New York, and California discussed 
above, Arizona, Maryland, New Jersey, Tennessee, and Vermont have also enacted legislation 
prohibiting the use and enforcement of nondisclosure provisions in settlement agreements for 
sexual harassment claims. See Wells, supra note 221; see also Maxine Neuhauser, Jeremy M. 
Brown & Denise Merna Dadika, New Jersey Responds to the #MeToo Era by Broadly Banning 
“Waiver of Rights” and Nondisclosure Provisions in Employment Agreements, NAT’L L. REV. 
(Mar. 26, 2019), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/new-jersey-responds-to-metoo-era-
broadly-banning-waiver-rights-and-nondisclosure [https://perma.cc/3J4T-MEBL]. 
 351. See Wells, supra note 221. 
 352. See supra Parts II.B.2–3. 
 353. See supra Part II.B.2.  On the federal level, a statute prohibiting nondisclosure 
agreements should also be passed.  The Ending the Monopoly of Power over Workplace 
Harassment Through Education and Reporting (EMPOWER) Act is a bipartisan effort to 
prohibit NDAs regarding sexual harassment as a condition for employment. S. 2994, 115th 
Cong. (2017).  The EMPOWER Act was reintroduced in March 2019. EMPOWER Act, H.R. 
1521, 116th Cong. (2019); EMPOWER Act, S. 575, 116th Cong. (2019). 
 354. Swetha Kannan & Priya Krishnakumar, A Powerful Person Has Been Accused of 
Misconduct at a Rate of Nearly Once Every 20 Hours Since Weinstein, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 29, 
2017), https://www.latimes.com/projects/la-na-sexual-harassment-fallout/ [https://perma.cc/ 
ZX3S-A2SC]. 
 355. See Gerstein, supra note 144. 
2019] MANDATORY ARBITRATION AND #METOO 2691 
actions can limit the impact of mandatory arbitration provisions on sexual 
harassment claims. 
